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Bankers Beware: The Risks of Syndicated Credits
I. INTRODUCTION
Syndicated credits are pieces of large loans, which consist of
"credits" of $50 million or more that the originators of the loans carve
up and sell to other parties.' For years, everyone from Alan
Greenspan2 to most recently Julie Williams3 has issued warnings to
national banks concerning the impending "troubled waters" or risks
associated with syndicated credits, warning banks against sliding
lending standards that could harm banks if the economy worsened.
Banks have been protected from poor lending practices by a good
economy that has buoyed up borrowers. However, these same lending
practices could cause banks significant harms in a less euphoric
economy that would produce more borrowers that are delinquent. The
much touted economic downturn arrived in 1998 in the form of the
bailout of the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management LP,4
1. Olaf de Senerpont Domis, Syndication Risk Getting Worrisome, Ludwig Warns,
AM. BANKER, Dec. 11, 1996, at 2. Burned by the severe industry-wide loan losses
suffered by banks in the 1980s, individual banks have been unwilling to take on the
tremendously large loans being demanded by the market. See id. "Banks, reeling from
sizable losses on loans for commercial real estate and credits to less-developed countries,
became reluctant to hold more than $20 million of any given credit in their portfolios."
Id.
2. See Greenspan Advocates Pricing Business Loans According to Risk, BANKING
POL'Y REP. Oct. 17, 1994, at 12, available in LEXIS, Bankng Library, Bnkpol File. For
more elaboration of former Chairman Greenspan's thoughts, see also Jaret Seiberg,
Greenspan Warns Banks on Lending at Thin Spreads, AM. BANKER, Feb. 25, 1998 at 1.
3. See Julie Williams, Encouraging Lenders to Stop, Look, Listen: An Address to the
RBAICBA Conference Participants (Sept. 1, 1998), in 81 J. LENDING AND CREDIT RISK
MGMT. 1 (1998) (remarking that the loan "picture is even more disturbing" since
commercial underwriting standards have slipped in every category of lending except
international loans for the fourth year in a row).
4. See Banks Clamp Down On Corporate Lending, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1998 at D4.
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York brokered a $3.6 billion rescue to prevent the
hedge fund from collapsing. See id. For more information on hedge funds and their
impact on national banks, see Hearing on Hedge Fund Operations Before the House
Comm. On Banking and Fin. Services, 105th Congress, 1st Sess. (1998) (Testimony of
Julie L. Williams, Comptroller of the Currency, as required by 12 U.S.C. § 250). See
also OCC Advisory Letter 98-45, Accounting for Derivatives and Hedging Activities,
[Vol. 5 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 71,154 (Oct. 6, 1998) (providing
a brief overview of the Financial Accounting Standards Board's new method for
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concerns about world financial stability as the Asian crisis developed,
the more pronounced volatility of the stock market, and disappointing
earnings forecasts reported by major companies. 5 Thus, while in 1997,
syndicated lending volume broke the $1 trillion mark for the first
time,6 the syndicated loan market for 1998 was not as robust. Total
syndicated loan volume in 1998 fell 22% to $872 billion.7
In syndicated lending, banks extend loans to corporate clients
and then redistribute most of the loan to reduce their own risk.8 As
the economic situation causes investors to act more cautiously, and
investors look more closely at the terms of the deal, the era of easy
dispersion of syndicated loans could be over.9 The economic
situation, combined with risks concomitant to erosion of lending
standards, has led to a decline in demand, indicating that perhaps the
syndicated loan market is coming under greater scrutiny. 1o
However, while a slumping economy may depress the market
for some economic activities, this economic environment could send
corporate clients in search of loans, providing a boon for banks."
accounting that goes into effect on January 1, 2000 for derivatives and hedging activities
(SFAS 133)).
5. See Banks Clamp Down on Corporate Lending, supra note 4, at D4. The world
economy has declined since July 1998. See id. For instance, Russia devalued its
currency and defaulted on debt and Thailand, South Korea, and Indonesia are in recession.
See id. See also Zach Schiller, Banks Tightening Up Credit, Fed Say, PLAIN DEALER,
Oct. 6, 1998, available in 1998 WL 4157692.
6. See Omri Ben-Amos, Syndications Ended '97 at $1 Trillion-And Rising, AM.
BANKER, Jan. 12, 1998, at 7.
7. See Paul Beckett, Syndication of Loans Sees Big Changes, WALL ST. J., Jan 27,
1999, at C1 (relying on the research firm Loan Pricing Corporation). Securities Data
Company reported, however, that syndicated loan volume totaled $1.012 trillion in 1998,
still down from the record $1.102 trillion in 1997. See David Weidner, Syndicated
Lending Boom Hits a Seventh-Year Glitch, AM. BANKER, Jan. 11, 1999, at 1. Regardless
of the exact figure, the decline in volume in 1999 was the first since the credit crisis of
1991. See id.
8. See Domis, supra note 1, at 2.
9. See Anita Raghavan, Syndicate Loans Get Difficult for Wall Street, WALL ST. J.,
June 24, 1998, at C1.
10. See id. Recently, Morgan Stanley was forced to postpone the syndication of the
loan after Sunbeam's chief executive was removed and its weakened financial condition
was revealed. See id. Also, Salomon Smith Barney, a relative newcomer to the
syndicated credit market, was unable to attract enough buyers to syndicate Meditrust
Corporation's $2.25 billion loan and was eventually replaced by J.P. Morgan and
Company. See id.
11. See Matt Murray & Paul Beckett, Syndicated Lending is Seen Falling in '98,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 1998, at C1 (noting the current major opportunities for the major
arrangers of syndicated debt).
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Arrangers of syndicated debt could profit from this economic turn of
events. 12 Banks that want to thrive in the crowded 3 syndicated loan
market should structure their deals to safeguard against risks that may
not be present at the time of the deal.14 By employing wise credit
standards, banks can both protect against costly risk and at the same
time attract customers. This Note first will define what a syndicated
credit is,"5 illustrate a sample transaction, 16 and list reasons for its
use. 7 It will then examine several risks that banks become exposed to
when syndicated credits are used. 18
12. See id. The top five syndicated loan managers in the first nine months of 1998
were: Chase Manhattan ($179.8 billion in proceeds and 23.9% of market share); Bank of
America ($122.4 billion in proceeds and 16.2% of market share; J.P. Morgan ($94.4
billion in proceeds and 12.5% of market share); Citicorp ($66.5 billion in proceeds and
8.8% of market share); and Bankers Trust (37.7 billion in proceeds and 5.0% in market
share). See id.
13. More banks want to enter the syndicated credit market, and are competing with
established leaders for the same number of deals. For more explanation, see Too Much
Money is Chasing Business, LLOYD'S LIST INT'L, Oct. 28, 1997, at 12 (analyzing
competition among banks for syndicated loans in the shipping industry).
14. See Banks Clamp Down on Corporate Lending, supra note 4, at D1. In a survey
conducted by the Federal Reserve Board, almost 30% of large banks (with assets of 15
billion or more) have reported tightening standards. See id. About 10% of the smaller
banks had done so. See id. When banks tighten lending standards, it does not necessarily
mean they charge higher rates. See Banks Tightening Up Credit, Fed Say, supra note 5,
at D4. They may require more collateral, shorten the length of the loan, or require a loan
recipient to personally guaranty more of the loan to his or her company. See id.
15. See infra notes 19-34 and accompanying text. Although there are many types of
credit agreements, this Note will address only credit agreements used for general business
dealings in which one or more lending institutions agree to lend to U.S. domestic
corporate borrowers. For information on foreign corporate borrowers, see Suzanne
Harrison, The Extraterritoriality of the Bankruptcy Code: Will the Borders Contain the
Code?, 12 BANKR. DEv. J. 809 (1996); Joseph J. Norton & Christopher D. Olive, The
Ongoing Process of International Bank Regulatory and Supervisory Convergence: A New
Regulatory-Market "Partnership," 16 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 227 (1997); Alfredo G.
Romero, The Letter of Intent in International Syndicated Financing: An Analysis of the
English and American Law from a Sovereign Borrowers' Perspective, 3 NAFTA: L. &
Bus. REV. AM. 74 (1997).
16. See infra notes 35-65 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 66-93 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 94-239 and accompanying text.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Syndicated Credit Defined
Multiple lender transactions' 9  generally fall into two
categories: loan participations 2 and loan syndications. 21  The first
category, loan participations, involves transactions where a lead (or
originating) lender sells a part of or all of a loan to one or more
purchasers.22 Participation, thus, can be defined as a third party's
acquisition of a specified percentage of a prearranged loan.23 The
relationship between the parties is typically formalized by a
participation agreement, which is an agreement in writing stating that
the purchaser receives an undivided interest in the loan.24 The sale
occurs after the lead lender has made the loan to the borrower. 5
Because all documentation and terms concerning the loan are agreed
upon and completed before the sale to any third party, the purchaser is
dependent upon the lead for protection of its interests in the loan. 26
Participations are usually used in secured loan transactions and the
value of the collateral of the underlying loans determines the credit
19. For treatment of issues surrounding multi-lender transactions not addressed by this
article, see W. Crews Lott et al., Multiple Lender Transactions: Current Issues, 112
BANKING L.J. 846 (1995) (including Uniform Commercial Code considerations, the
inclusion of exculpatory clauses, and discussion of relevant case law).
20. A participation is the "acquisition by a third party from the lender of an interest in
a loan; a participant entering into an established loan generally takes all of the agreements
between the lender and the borrower 'as is' ..... " Stuart Hirshfield, Joint Loans and
Participations, in ASSET BASED FINANCING: A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE § 10.02[1]
(Howard Ruda ed., Matthew Bender 1994). See also OCC Advisory Letter 97-21,
Guidance on Sales of 100% Loan Participations, [Vol. 6 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking
L. Rep. (CCH) 73,115-16 (April 10, 1997) (providing guidance for short term loans
originated by an institution that sells off, without recourse, 100% of the participation
under a continuing program, and retains no interest in the originated loan).
21. A syndicated credit is a joint loan wherein "each lender is in direct privity of
contract with the borrower and has rights and may have claims which are assertable
directly against the borrower; ... [and] each lender makes its own loan to the borrower
under the general terms of the joint loan agreement." Hirshfield, supra note 20, § 10.03.
22. See id. § 10.02[2]. For an explication of recent cases impacting loan
participations, see also W. Crews Lott et al., Structuring Multiple Lender Transactions,
112 BANKING L.J. 734 (1995) [hereinafter Lott et al., Structuring].
23. See Hirshfield, supra note 20, § 10.02[1].
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See id.
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rating.27 The collateral protects the acquiring lender from any infirmity
in the terms arranged by the lead lender. Despite the involvement of
third party lenders, the borrower's contractual relationship often
remains strictly with the lead lender. 28 Thus, the borrower may
remain totally unaware that a participant in the loan exists. 2 9
The second type of multi-lender transaction, loan syndications,
involve two or more lenders who make a loan(s) to a borrower under a
common loan agreement.3 ° Each lender is a syndicate member. 3'
Unlike participations, the borrower has direct relationships with each
of the lenders. 2 Thus, each syndicate member is in direct privity of
contract with the borrower.33 Each syndicate member can rely on
typical lending practices when documenting the terms of the agreement
between themselves and the borrower since syndicated credit
transactions are similarly documented as any single lender loan.34
B. Sample Transaction
In a syndicated credit, one of the lenders will be designated as
the agent-bank (agent) for the other syndicate members and the
borrower. 35  The agent is typically the lender owning the largest
percentage of the loan or the lender with enough industrial clout to
form a syndicate of lenders. 6 The agent may also be the lender with
an established relationship with the borrower.37  The agent is
responsible for structuring the intended credit facility, pricing the
loan, developing information pertaining to the borrower (and
providing that information to other co-lenders in the syndicate) and
27. See id. § 10.01[1]. The collateral protects the acquiring lender from financial
losses not protected or accounted for in the participation agreement. See id. Thus, not
being involved in the negotiation of the participation agreement typically does not put the
acquiring lender at risk. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
30. See Hirshfield, supra note 20, § 10.01[1].
31. See id. § 10.03[2].
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See id. § 10.03[1]. See generally PETER S. CLARKE, COMPLETE GUIDE TO LOAN
DOCUMENTATION (1986) (describing typical loan documentation practices).
35. See Hirshfield, supra note 20, § 10.03[3].
36. See id.
37. See id.
1999]
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negotiating and closing the transaction. 3 Thus, all formal
communications between the lenders, as a group, and the borrower are
conducted through the agent and all funds are disbursed through and
received by the agent.39
The agent will begin a syndicated credit like any other loan
between a borrower and a lender.4° The agent may draw other lenders
from its own established contacts or it may have to work with a
network of lenders already chosen by the borrower. 4' The agent
prepares a term sheet 42 (summarizing key aspects of the loan)43 to
circulate to the syndicate members.' Each syndicate member may
address comments on the terms and provisions to the agent. 45 Once
the members are in agreement and the borrower agrees to the general
terms of the loan, the agent will begin46 drafting the document.47
38. See id. Negotiation of a lending agreement "is in essence a team or cooperative
effort." SIDNEY S. GOLDSTEIN, BANK LOAN AGREEMENTS 1 (1990). It requires the
"expertise of counsel, senior management and the corporation's accountants." Id.
Although necessarily the counsel must become familiar with the corporation's business,
"counsel should not be placed in the untenable position of acting as a financial analyst and
managerial expert." Id. Further, to make sure that the borrower's undertaking in the
credit agreement is not unsuitable or impossible to fulfill, the borrower and its accountants
should also be involved at some point in the negotiating and drafting stage of the credit
agreement. See id. See generally SANDRA SCHNITZER STERN, STRUCTURING COMMERCIAL
LOAN AGREEMENTS § 10.06[1] (2d ed. 1990) (describing how a syndicated credit differs
substantially from a single bank loan agreement).
39. For background information on common issues regarding the formation of a
syndicate, see GOLDSTEIN, supra note 38, at 335. For more information on the structuring
phase of multilender relationships, see Lott et al., Structuring, supra note 22, at 736.
40. See Hirshfield, supra note 20, § 10.03[3][b].
41. See id.
42. See Venrice R. Palmer, Negotiating and Drafting Bank Credit Agreements, in
DOING DEALS 1997: UNDERSTANDING THE NUTS AND BOLTS OF TRANSACTIONAL PRACTICE,
831, 837 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B4-7168, 1997). A
term sheet is a summary of the basic terms of the tentatively agreed-upon transaction. See
id. It is not intended to be binding. See id. This summary will be sent to the proposed
syndicate banks along with an invitation to participate in the loan. See id. (citing C.
Edward Dobbs and Bobbi Acord Gomez, Commitment Letters: Uses and Pitfalls, 76 THE
J. OF COM. LENDING 11 (1993)).
43. This may be substitute for or in conjunction with a proposal letter (generally a
non-binding indication of interest in a loan by a lender to a potential borrower.) See
Palmer, supra note 43, at 837. See also Marsha E. Simms, Structuring and Closing of
Commercial Loans, in BANKING AND COMMERCIAL LENDING LAW, at 163 (ALI-ABA
Course of Study, 1997).
44. See Simms, supra note 43, at 165.
45. See id. The adequacy of the terms will depend on the syndicate member's
individual assessment of the borrower. See id.
46. The American Bar Association recommends that commercial lenders address the
following issues prior to documentation: lender's control over borrower's cash, timing of
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Since all lenders are parties to all agreements, each lender must make
its own loan to the borrower under the general terms of the syndicated
credit agreement.4" Accordingly, each lender will receive a
promissory note made by the borrower for the percentage of the loan
made by that particular lender, which also bears interest at the rate
specifically agreed to with that lender. 49 Beyond the general terms,
each specific syndicate member is at liberty to enact more terms or
covenants with the borrower.5" Each syndicate member typically
employs special counsel5 ' to draft the promissory note, any security
agreements it particularly desires, and to supervise the legal aspects of
the loan.52
In addition to the general terms of the loan, the syndicate
members must agree to certain special provisions.5 3  They will
determine among themselves the necessary percentage of lenders
required to approve aspects relating to the borrower or to the loan
itself.5 4 For example, a majority vote of the syndicate members may
be necessary to consent to acquisitions, a sale of assets, or a
declaration of dividends by the borrower. 55 A similar provision may be
required financial reporting, schedules for necessary environmental reporting, deadlines
for real estate surveys or appraisals, landlord waiver issues, interest rate protection if it is
a floating rate loan, and necessity of solvency letters. See id.
47. See id (noting five protective provisions that the agent should include for itself).
48. See id.
49. See id. The interest rate may be based on: the lender's own prime rate, the prime
rate of the lead lender, the average rate of a group of lenders, or a rate based up6n an
agreed index. See id.
50. See id.
51. An important role lawyers play in lending transactions is in "helping to structure a
loan that provides protection to the lender and at the same time allows the lender's
customer to conduct its business in the normal course." Id. Too much protection for the
lender can actually jeopardize the borrower's ability to conduct business and thus
jeopardize the very means of repayment. See id.
52. See id. One legal aspect of the loan attorneys consider is lender liability. For
general treatment of lender liability, see Robert F. Finke & Janet L. Reed, Experts in
Lender Liability Lawsuits: Their Use and Misuse - A Practical Guide in Outline Form, in
BANKING AND COMMERCIAL LENDING LAW, at 183 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, 1989);
Richard J. Goldstein, Loan Structures and Third Party Problems, in ASSET BASED
LENDING at 333 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. A4-4250,
1989); John Francis Hilton, Drafting Loan Documents in Order to Avoid Lender Liability
Claims, in LENDER LIABILITY LITIGATION 1989: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, at 871 (PLI
Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. A4-4277, 1989).
53. See Hirshfield, supra note 20, § 10.03[3][c].
54. See id.
55. See id.
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required to waive the borrower's failure to maintain an agreed upon
amount of net worth or other similar covenant.5 6 To approve an act of
the borrower, a majority in amount 7 of the outstanding principal
amount of the loan or alternatively, a majority in number58 of the
holders of the borrower's notes may be required. s9
After the original syndication has been made, syndicate
members can find buyers for the original syndicated loan in a small
secondary market.6 Though trading volume has tripled since 1994,
the secondary trading of syndicated loans represented a minuscule
percentage of the $1 trillion worth of syndicated loans originated in
1997.61 Further, the growth potential is enormous, since only a small
fraction of non-bank investors have "discovered" loans as an asset
class.62 This secondary trading growth potential is evidenced by the
announcement of the Loan Syndication Trading Association to compile
an index that would measure the value of the leveraged loans in the
secondary market, scheduled to be unveiled in late 1999.6 This index
may help the secondary loan market grow as large as the markets for
collateralized mortgage obligations and asset-backed securities. 64
Similar to the emerging syndicated loan market, those markets did not
exist twenty years ago. 65 Thus, secondary trading may become a more
common aspect of a syndicated loan transaction.
56. See id.
57. See id. This provision would allow those who own a larger percentage of a loan
have more control. See id. For example, if it was a $100 million syndicated credit, only
enough votes of lenders equaling $50 million would be needed to approve an action. See
id.
58. See id. This provision would allow each lender have the same decision making
power. See id. For example, if it was a $100 million syndicated credit, 50% of all the
lenders (regardless of the percentage held) would be needed. See id.
59. See id.
60. See David Weidner, Wall Street Taking Steps to Speed Growth of Secondary Loan
Market, AM. BANKER, Dec. 9, 1998, at 1. Some banks see the loans traded in the
secondary market as undesirable, as the place where foreign investors and the investment
banks get rid of loans they no longer want to hold. See id.
61. See id. (relying on Loan Pricing Corporation of New York, it represented about
$50 billion out of the $1 trillion syndicated credit loan pool). The secondary market for
syndicated loans is growing, however. See id.
62. See id.
63. See id. The association is also redesigning its mark-to-market program, which
provides portfolio managers with the latest bids and offers on 750 secondary market loans
as reported by association members (scheduled to be finished to by spring 1999). See id.
64. See id.
65. See id.
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C. Reasons For Its Use
A lender may choose a syndicated credit agreement for several
reasons. First, banking regulations restrict the amount of loans banks
may make to any one borrower.66 A bank can lend an additional 10%
of its capital when the additional loans are fully secured by marketable
collateral.67 Thus, a bank may not be able to provide a large enough
loan for one of its customers if such loan exceeded 25% of the bank's
capital. Second, agents may augment their income 68 through fee
income.69 Third, banks may wish to diversify their portfolios. 70 This
is especially true of regional banks whose portfolios reflect the
businesses and industries in their area, exposing a bank to the
detrimental reliance on one business climate. 71 Fourth, capital banks
must hold a certain amount against their assets, otherwise known as
regulatory capital72 restrictions, which may preclude a bank from
adding a large loan or commitment to its balance sheet. 73 With
66. Thus, national banks typically may not lend more than 15 % of their capital to any
one borrower. See 12 U.S.C. § 84(a)(1) (1994). See also Lott et al., Structuring, supra
note 22, at 734.
67. See 12 U.S.C. § 84(a)(2) (1994).
68. Three large regional banks reported second quarter earnings in 1998 ahead of
Wall Street expectations due to growth in fee income. See id. Further, at Chase
Manhattan, fees from syndicated lending, investment grade bond underwriting and other
investment banking activities rose 55% from last year to $438 million. See Matt Murray
& Joseph B. Cahill, Chase, Citicorp Profits Top Estimates; Fee Income Lifts Net at
Regional Banks, WALL ST. J., July 22, 1998, at A4.
69. Fees are imposed for a variety of purposes: a flat fee added to increase the yield
of the loan, a fee designed to cover the costs incurred with syndicating the loan (for
structuring and negotiating the loan package, underwriting the loan, and advising the
borrower), or a fee for serving as agent in the administration of the syndicated credit. See
Foreign Lending, 2 O.C.C. Q.J. 50 (1983), available in 1983 WL 175064.
70. See id.
71. See Palmer, supra note 42, at 837. See also Alan Sanborn, New Risk
Management Tools Help Credit Quality, AM. BANKER, Oct. 15, 1997, at 4 (noting that
statutory restrictions on geographic distribution have lessened considerably, allowing
greater diversification and less concentration).
72. See Donald J. Tuomey, Bank Regulation, Bank Accounting, and Bank Failures, in
1991 ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW 823, 825 ("The capital of a banking
organization is a very simple concept. Capital is what is left over after one subtracts the
total of the banking organization's liabilities from the total of its assets.").
73. For treatment of the FDIC's role, see Thomas M. L. Metzger, FDIC Capital
Directive Procedures: The Unacceptable Risk of Bias, 110 BANKING L.J. 237 (1993)
(discussing the FDIC's ability to issue a capital directive, an order to a bank to raise its
capital holdings, and the inadequacy of providing only one opportunity for banks to
challenge this).
1999]
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syndication, the amount of capital a bank is required to maintain
against the particular loan is less than if the bank was the sole lender
for the entire amount. The bank must retain only a portion of the loan
(and thus is required to only have reserves for that portion) as opposed
to the entire balance of the loan. 74
Further, syndicated credits allow greater autonomy for each
syndicate member when compared to a loan participation. 5 If taken
advantage of, banks can actively protect their own financial interests in
the loan rather than being forced to rely on the lead lender to steer the
76transaction. For example, each syndicate member is given an equal
opportunity to obtain directly from the borrower information which
helps banks ascertain if the borrower is an acceptable risk based on the
bank's own criteria." Each syndicate member also has direct control
over the terms and provision in the loan agreement beyond the general
terms. 78 Likewise, all members have control over waivers, consents
and acceleration, and they have agreed to the required percentage of
lenders necessary to act. 79 Thus, banks receive greater control over
their investments. They have the means to choose and shape
investments that coincide with the amount of risk that they are willing
to undertake.
Another reason banks choose syndication is because each
member is in the advantageous position of being able to protect its
investment by participating in the enforcement of the loan in case of a
delinquent borrower.8" If the loan is secured, each syndicate member
has a direct interest in the collateral as security for its proportionate
loan, despite the fact that another lender designated as agent perfects
the security interest.8 ' Thus, each member is able to enforce remedies
relating to its security interests and to direct the agent's acts upon the
74. More than ever, Congress and federal agencies are focusing on the importance of
a bank's capital as a measure of its health. See Tuomey, supra note 72, at 825.
75. See Hirshfield, supra note 20, § 10.03[4][a].
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See id. Despite the fact that an agent might draft the agreement, each syndicate
member has a voice in determining its provisions. See id.
79. See id.
80. See id. Each member has individual contractual privity with the borrower,
enabling each member to begin enforcement action if necessary. See id.
81. See id.
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event of the borrower's default.8 2 Members can even go so far as to
demand maintenance of individual deposit accounts, or payments of
additional monies for the borrower's failure to maintain covenants. 83
A borrower may enter a credit agreement for a variety of
different reasons. It may need an immediate loan for acquisition of
assets, debt refinancing, or inventory financing.1 4  Alternatively, the
borrower may want the security of a committed facility from which it
can borrow on relatively short notice, since the terms and conditions
have been negotiated "up front." s This is known as a revolving line
of credit 6 and "frequently include a subfacility for the issuance of
letters of credit to fund the working capital needs of the borrower." 87
The borrower may also enjoy several benefits from being in a
direct relationship with several lenders. Also, if one lender is played
against another, the competition among the banks to obtain the loan
may result in the borrower obtaining more flexible loan terms and a
more favorable interest rate on the entire loan.8 ' Additionally, if the
borrower wishes to expand nationally or regionally, a syndicated loan
obtained from lenders throughout the targeted expansion region results
in an advantage for the borrower. 9 Once the loan is established, local
82. See id.
83. See id. Banks want to know the borrower's ongoing operating results during the
term of the loan and will want certain restrictions on the borrower's business. See id.
These restrictions are known as covenants. See Palmer, supra note 42, at 869-85.
84. See id. Certain short-term obligations may be classified as long-term debt where
the debtor has the ability to refinance the short-term obligations with long-term debt. See
id (citing D. EDWARD MARTIN, ATTORNEY'S HANDBOOK OF ACCOUNTING, AUDITING, AND
FINANCIAL REPORTING (1994)). If certain conditions are met, a credit agreement with a
term greater than a year could be used for this purpose. See id.; see also David J. Lamb,
Issues in Long-Term Debt Classification, 65 CPA J. 44 (1995).
85. Palmer, supra note 42, at 833.
86. See id. at 835. Often called a "revolver," this obligates a bank to lend up to a
stated amount. 1d. The borrower may prepay and reborrow throughout the term of the
agreement. See id. Typically, the borrower only pays interest on outstanding principal
and repays the principal upon expiration of the agreement. See id.
87. See id. See also OCC Interpretative Letter No. 412, Legal Lending Limits:
General Obligation of States and Political Subdivisions [1988-89 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCII) 85,636 (Jan. 26, 1988) (describing the impact of standby letters
of credit on a bank's legal lending limits).
88. See Hirshfield, supra note 20, § 10.03[4][b]. For example, New England
Electrical Systems recently replaced bilateral lines of credit with its first syndicated credit
because the company was able to secure better pricing (LIBOR plus .25%). See
Borrowing Strategies: New England Electric Opens First Syndicated Credit, BANK
LETTER, Dec. 15, 1997, available in 1997 WL 12156694.
89. See Hirshfield, supra note 20, § 10.03[4][b].
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credit references or other information concerning the borrower can be
obtained from a lender in that region.90 Further, the lenders, for
hardly altruistic reasons, may introduce new business contacts to the
borrower in order to assist the expansion of the business.9' Lastly,
borrowers with widespread offices and plants may be pleased with the
ability of syndicate member banks to provide payroll check cashing or
other customer service perks to employees by members in those
areas. 92 Suddenly, the borrower is provided with a larger network of
financial resources by utilizing syndicate members located throughout
the country. 93
III. RISKS OF SYNDICATED CREDITS
A. Institutional Investment
The number, size, and complexity of syndicated credit
transactions have grown dramatically as lenders have shifted their
focus from investment growth to both maximum return on assets and
more cautious risk diversification. 94 Consequently, syndicated credit
agreements are no longer strictly composed of traditional bank to bank
relationships.9 s Today, multi-lender credits increasingly are composed
of nontraditional lenders such as mutual funds, trust departments,
corporate treasuries, and other institutional investors. 96 This increased
institutional investment in syndicated credits has brought about two
risks to banks: that institutional investors will crowd out commercial
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See OCC Advisory Letter 97-3, Credit Undenvriting Standards and Portfolio
Credit Risk Management, [Vol. 6 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH)
73,271, at 73,274 (Mar. 11, 1997). Banks are now focusing on managing exposure and
on return rather than on credit issues. See id. This trend is caused by the reality of
today's market: there is more demand for high-yield commercial paper (short-term
unsecured promissory notes of a prime corporation) than there is a supply of investment-
quality transactions. See id. See also TIMOTHY W. KOCH, BANK MANAGEMENT 98 (3d
ed. 1995).
95. See Mahua Dutta, Institutional Investors' Rush to Bank Loans Poses a Puzzle for
Banks, AM. BANKER, July 23, 1997, at 12.
96. See id.
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banks and that institutional syndicate members will compete to supply
the financial services required by the borrower.
1. Crowd out commercial banks
The first risk that commercial banks are exposed to when they
use syndicated credits is the threat to the management of the loan
syndicate due to the increased participation of institutional investors. 97
The influx of institutional investors can make syndicated credits so
risky that commercial banks will not become a part of the deal. This
first effect is due to the two different approaches to investments
embraced by commercial banks versus institutional investors.
Institutional investors take more of a "bond mind-set"9 8 (or trading
mentality) rather than a more cautious "secured mind-set" in their
approach to the loan. 99 Commercial banks, characterized by the senior
secured mind-set, typically are attracted to the stability of the loan
market.100 A loan's value is tied to interest rates. This makes them
less volatile.'10 Since banks value their loans at face value, there is
not much incentive to trade them.10 2 The hallmark of this mind-set is
the buy-and-hold strategy, a risk adverse strategy that does not require
active maintenance of the investment. 103 This is in contrast to the bond
mindset, characterized by investment banks and fund managers, who
are accustomed to pricing the value of their investments daily against
the market.'0 4 If a loan's value rises or falls, they view it as an
97. See OCC Advisory Letter 97-3, supra note 94, at 73,271.
98. Dutta, Institutional Investors' Rush to Bank Loans Poses a Puzzle for Banks,
supra note 95, at 12. Investors earn interest on their bond inventory but it exists primarily
to make a profit on the difference between purchase and sale price. See id. Thus, this
mind-set is characterized by investors that are accustomed to weathering the risk that the
market value of its inventory might decrease. See id.
99. Dutta, Institutional Investors' Rush to Bank Loans Poses a Puzzle for Banks,
supra note 95, at 12 (stating that "what someone with a senior secured mind-set might
view as a risk to a transaction-and a reason to bail out-someone with a bond mind-set
would see as an opportunity to invest more").
100. See Weidner, Wall Street Taking Steps to Speed Growth of Secondary Loan
Market, supra note 60, at 1.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id.
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opportunity to buy or sell to balance their portfolios. lO Market
volatility is desirable, and thus institutional investors are more risk
tolerant.
If institutional investors become a majority of the syndicated
credit agreement, this position could give them the votes necessary to
control the future of a deal. Many bankers are "loath" to allow these
nontraditional institutional investors to take control of a lending group:
"[t]he fear is that the investors will force bankers to remain committed
to transactions with which they are uncomfortable." 106 For example,
if institutional investors gain control of more than 50% of a syndicated
loan, syndicate members should be concerned about the fate of the
syndicate in case of default. Typically, if a borrower defaults, the
result is acceleration by the syndicate members of all outstanding
borrowings and immediate nullification of the syndicate's commitment
to lend. 107 However, most standard credit agreements provide that the
borrower is not in default until the agent declares to the borrower that
the occurrence is an event of default." s An agent bank often may not
declare default without first obtaining permission of a majority or all
of the syndicate members, depending on the specific agreement. 10 9
Thus, if disputes arise among lenders, bankers versus institutional
investors, concerning the correct course of action, the result may delay
or thwart a lender's need to act quickly and decisively. no
This inability to agree and the delay it causes can result in a
costly loss of rights by the lenders. For example, if lenders cannot
agree whether to set off"' balances or to exercise remedies against
105. See id.
106. Dutta, Institutional Investors' Rush to Bank Loans Poses a Puzzle for Banks,
supra note 95, at 12.
107. See Palmer, supra note 42, at 885.
108. See id. See generally Mark Thompson, Recent Developments Involving Distressed
Bank Debt, in BANKING AND COMMERCIAL LENDING LAW, at 427 (ALI-ABA Course of
Study, 1996) (noting the growing trend of bank lenders to dispose of distressed loans
rather than holding on through workout or Chapter 11).
109. See William C. Tompsett, Interbank Relations in Loan Participation Agreements:
From Structure to Workout, 101 BANKING L.J. 31, 34 (1984). "A multibank agreement
generally provides that certain action, including the acceleration of payments after
default... may or must be taken with the consent of a certain specified percentage or
number of banks." Id.
110. See Hirshfield, supra note 20, at § 10.03[5][a].
111. See generally Edwin E. Smith, Securities Interest in Deposit Accounts, in THE
EMERGED AND EMERGING NEW UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, at 129 (ALI-ABA Course of
Study, 1996) (identifying a set-off in a syndicated credit as a problem area).
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collateral' 12 of a defaulting borrower, the delay could give the
borrower enough time to take action that will end up costing the
lenders." 3 The lenders' disagreements give the borrower as a debtor
in possession time to maneuver to put off or prevent a set off,"
4
enforce the stay against the lenders notifying account debtors or other
proceeding against the collateral," 5 or perhaps even obtaining the use
of the lenders' collateral." 6  The attitudes concerning investment
between banks and institutional investors, and the time it takes to
resolve them, can result in financial loss. Thus, because of the influx
of institutional money into the bank loan market, banks now are facing
the problem of staying in control of the transactions they become a
part of.
In addition, institutional investors could influence the market
so that commercial banks could not participate without investment in
trading expertise." 7 This second effect of the influx of institutional
money may cause a paradigm shift in how loans are valued.
Institutional investors' trading mentality could change the market for
syndicated loans drastically. As loans on the secondary market
become more liquid, trades will become more frequent and prices will
become more accurate. This will make it easier to judge the value of
a loan as determined by the market (which institutional investors
desire),"' not its face value (which bankers are accustomed to using).
Smaller banks, which do little or no secondary trading, might suffer
the most." 9 This is because larger banks, more adept at secondary
trading, would be able to sell more loans to investors without holding
significant portions.12 0  Large banks will then originate syndicated
112. See id. An example of this would be notifying the debtors to pay their outstanding
accounts receivable directly to the lenders before the filing of a reorganization petition.
See id.
113. See id.
114. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1994).
115. See id.
116. See id. § 363.
117. See Weidner, Wall Street Taking Steps to Speed Growth of Secondary Loan
Market, supra note 60, at 1.
118. See id. (quoting a director from Standard and Poor's about how a shift to daily
pricing would mark a fundamental change for commercial banks: "It was never part of a
banker's model for thinking about those kinds of market conditions. A banker never
cared if he could sell those loans for 100 cents on the dollar.").
119. See id.
120. See id.
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loans for volume, driving down returns for smaller banks. 2 ' To make
up for loss of market share consumed by the large banks that would be
striving for quantity of loans, small banks would need to become
active players in the secondary market, which would require a costly
investment in a sophisticated trading desk. 2 2  Thus, as more
institutional investors enter the syndicated loan market, and the trading
mentality becomes more the rule than the exception, commercial banks
unwilling to embrace the trading mentality may be driven out of the
market.
2. Increased Competition
Another more subtle structural risk faced by banks of increased
involvement of institutional investors is increased competition for
financial services.12 1 The syndicate members each have a direct
relationship with the borrower. 24  An agent, or any member of a
syndicate, that had an exclusive relationship or even a preferred
relationship with the borrower before the syndicated credit might find
it difficult to maintain. 125 Syndicate members ultimately may have to
compete among themselves for desirable business from the
borrower.126  Thus, the agent may be personally introducing the
competition to its customers. 27 By including institutional investors in
syndicated transactions, banks are running the risk of graduating their
own clients into these other firms. 2' As unregulated non-banks begin
to offer more diverse financial services, 29 this impact of this risk has
121. See id. (A volume business focuses on fee income rather than loan income. See
id. A secondary market would eliminate pricing efficiencies, and drive down spreads on
new loans. See id.
122. See id.
123. See Palmer, supra note 42, at 885. See also OCC Advisory Letter 97-3, supra
note 94, at 73,271.
124. See id.
125. See Hirshfield, supra note 20, § 10.03[5][a].
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See id. For example, General Electric is planning to enter the syndicated loan
market in 1999. See David Weidner, GE Capital Service Aims to Compete as Loan
Syndication Leader, AM. BANKER, Dec. 15, 1998, at 29. The $250 billion asset unit of
GE has participated in the syndicated credit market for some time by buying deals
structured by other banks. See id. Now, however, it wants to compete to lead large loans
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potentially far-reaching consequences for bank' maintenance of market
share. 13
0
Banks can overcome the problems created by institutional
investment with the right management. First, a bank's risk
management structure should anticipate future economic problems.
The syndicated credit transactions that banks underwrite should be
"consistent with its long-term strategic portfolio objectives and the
level of risk the bank is willing to tolerate over the long run." 131
Thus, when considering syndicated lending, a bank must weigh the
inevitable influx of institutional investors and the concomitant
challenges, increased competition and loss of control of the syndicate.
Also, banks should structure "compensation systems for the lending
area (which would) reward the kind of behavior that is consistent with
long-term credit quality objectives." 132 Second, a bank's credit culture
133should "reflect the standards and values of the board of directors
and senior management."1 34  Thus, lenders should be wary of
purchasing loans that are based on underwriting standards set by
another syndicate member that are significantly different from their
own internal criteria. 1 3' To assure compliance with the bank's credit
culture, the OCC recommends that a bank's senior management and
the board "should periodically assess whether employees'
understanding if the bank's credit culture, and their resulting behavior,
conform with the desired standards and values for the bank." 
136
Additionally, independent audit and internal loan review functions
could help in this assessment.
37
for companies in sectors in which it has expertise. See id.
130. See id. When asked if commercial banking could eclipse investment banking, one
businessman tellingly replied that "'Investment bankers think more like businessmen....
Some of the commercial banks are trying to change, but they don't have the reputation
yet. Unless they're bringing a product that is unique to them, they really don't have a lot
more to offer than an investment bank does.'" Omri Ben-Amos, Wanted: A Relationship
Beyond the Deal, AM. BANKER, Mar. 17, 1997, at 24 (emphasis added).
131. OCC Advisory Letter 97-3, supra note 94, at 73,271.
132. Id.
133. See id.
134. Id.
135. See id.
136. Id.
137. See id. The OCC has acknowledged "the need to formalize the various elements"
will "depend on the size of the bank, the complexity of its portfolio, and the credit risks it
has assumed." Id.
1999]
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
B. Easing of Credit Terms
Additionally, the great influx of new entrants in the syndicated
credit loan market has increased competitive conditions which have
"encouraged an easing of credit terms and conditions in both
commercial and consumer lending."' 38  A prospering economy has
shored up weak credit terms, allowing banks to survive the
weaknesses in their loan agreements while the economy is good. One
example of this is the lack of covenants in the syndicated credit
agreements. 39  Most banks make a decision to extend credit to a
borrower based on the borrower's credit rating and business
prospects. 40 Thus, throughout the term of the loan, a prudent bank
will want to enact certain restrictions on the borrower's business to
maintain the continued good health (repayment ability) of the
borrower.'41 These restrictions are designed to ensure that a borrower
maintains a sufficient operating cash flow to amortize any borrowings,
a credit status that stays at a level which banks feel is commensurate
with the loan commitment, and sufficient assets to remain a viable
entity throughout the entire term of the loan. 142  These goals are
achieved through contractual covenants."' Therefore, the absence of
this credit term in syndicated credit agreements leaves the very
repayment ability of the borrower undermined, exposing the syndicate
138. Id. Likewise, the Federal Reserve Board stated that "the recent easing may not
be imprudent, the incentives and pressures to lower credit standards have increased as
competition has intensified and borrowers have experienced generally favorable business
and economic conditions." FRB Supervison and Regulation Letter 97-21, Secondary
Market Credit Activities, [Vol. 4 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 37,707,
at 37, 710 (July 11, 1997).
139. See Omri Ben-Amos, Honeywell Demands that its Banks Understand It, AM.
BANKER, June 11, 1997, at 19. Honeywell's recently acquired $1.325 billion, five year
revolver syndicated credit agreement contained no financial covenants. See id. When
asked if banks resisted the absence of covenants, the chief financial officer replied that he
"'encountered some resistance, but we were able to overcome that by focusing on the total
financial relationship that we wanted and expected to have with our banks.'" Id.
140. See Palmer, supra note 42, at 865.
141. See id. See also Dev Strischek, Coming to Terms with Financial Covenants, 76 J.
OF COMM. LENDING 11 (1994); Julie A. Whitaker, Guidelines for Structuring Loans, 75 J.
OF COMM. LENDING 18 (1993) (discussing "negotiating tips" from the bank's
perspective).
142. See Palmer, supra note 41, at 868.
143. See id. at 868-79 (listing typical provisions in covenants). These covenants can be
affirmative, requiring the borrower to act, or negative, prohibiting the borrower from
acting or allowing specified events to occur. See id.
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members to possible financial loss. 144
Syndicate members should also plan for changes in tax
increases, new laws, new regulatory capital rules, or new reserve
requirements that may arise after the syndicated credit agreement is
entered into by including a protective credit term. 145 Prospective
thinking concerning the administrative segment in a portfolio can help
syndicates establish predetermined courses of action. 4 6  Thus,
syndicates can avoid the unpleasantness of having to negotiate a new
term in a time of crisis, and after the original deal has been completed,
which drastically reduces the syndicates' bargaining power. To insure
a certain profit from the transaction, an agent should put in the loan
agreement a credit term that borrowers absorb these additional
costs. 147
Active loan portfolio management can avert some to the risks
presented by loose credit terms, allowing banks to remain competitive
while protecting against risk. Active loan portfolio management views
management in terms of the entire portfolio, as opposed to a more
traditional approach of individual loan oversight, in managing overall
credit risk.148  The OCC views it as an essential tool in trouble-
shooting for prospective financial. 149  A primary goal of active loan
portfolio management is to control the strategic risk associated with
lending.' Poor strategic decisions about "underwriting standards,
loan portfolio growth, new loan products, or geographic and
demographic markets" can jeopardize a bank's future.'5 ' Active loan
144. See id. See also Chase Amends Bruno's, 12 BANK LOAN REP. 37, Sept. 15, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 11236726 (discussing that as agent of Bruno's Inc.'s syndicated
credit agreement, Chase Manhattan agreed to an amendment and waiver of certain
financial covenants which will permit Bruno's to use up to $200 million under the
revolving credit portion of its bank credit facility, despite declining sales).
145. See Palmer, supra note 42, at 888.
146. See OCC Advisory Letter 97-3, supra note 94, at 73,271.
147. See id.
148. See id. "An effective loan portfolio credit risk management process enables
management to identify, measure, monitor and control credit risk." Id.
149. See Omri Ben-Amos, CIBC Unit Hire Loan Portfolio Chief, AM. BANKER, Sept.
2, 1997, at 13. The trend of active portfolio management can be seen in the marketplace.
See id. The role of loan portfolio managers will become more important as the bank loan
market expands and syndicated loans become increasingly liquid. See id.
150. See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Risks Associated with Lending:
Loan Portfolio Management, COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK (April 1998), available in 1998
WL 161400 [hereinafter Loan Portfolio Management].
151. Id. The OCC warns that examiners should be particularly alert to new business
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portfolio management can help minimize the risk of inadequate credit
terms that banks undertake when participating in a syndicated loan. It
is broken down into three phases: planning, acquisition, and
monitoring and review.15
2
The first phase is portfolio planning. 15 3  Instead of making
decisions on a transaction by transaction basis, loan decisions would
be made in accordance with a bank's ideal portfolio. 15 4  Using a
planning effort involving the line business units, senior management,
and board of directors, a bank would determine its ideal portfolio. 155
It would establish the markets it wishes to target, volume and types of
credit it is willing to offer, and prices it will charge up front. 5 6 The
ideal portfolio would be the "measuring stick" that all other potential
transactions would be evaluated against prior to making any lending
decisions and credit terms would have to comport with it. 17 A bank's
lender and marketing personnel, armed with this information, could
look for credits that meet the established criteria. More importantly,
the established criteria can reign in lending and generous credit terms
during a positive economic environment. '
The second phase in portfolio management is portfolio
acquisition. 5 9 In this phase, the bank will use some tools, such as
and product ventures that require significant planning and oversight to ensure adequate
risk management. See id. For example, many banks loan to "sub-prime" borrowers.
See id. The lending activity may be familiar, but the borrower's behavior may vary
drastically from a bank's average customer. See id. See also Evan Gilreath, Note, The
Entrance of Banks into Subprime Lending: First Union and The Money Store, 3 N.C.
BANKING INST. 149 (1999) (discussing the current trend of banks acquiring subprime
lending institutions).
152. See Loan Portfolio Management, supra note 150.
153. See Carol M. Beaumier, Active Credit Portfolio Management May Avert Serious
Loan Problems, BANKING POL'Y REP., Dec. 1, 1997, at 1, available in LEXIS, Bankng
Library, Bnkpol File.
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. See id. In particular cases, banks could identify target clients by name, and in
effect, those will be pre-underwritten. See id.
157. See id. at 15. Where transactions that meet the established bank criteria cannot be
found, bankers are using credit derivatives to redesign their portfolios. See id. These can
be used to "lay off concentration risk, to reduce individual borrower risk, or even add a
certain type of risk, i.e., an industry risk, that may be a buffer to protect other loans in
the portfolio." Id. at 16.
158. See id. Thus, a bank can increase the efficiency and effectiveness of marketing
efforts and target specific risk levels by gathering portfolio information. See id.
159. See id. (defining portfolio acquisition as "how the institution analyzes, structures,
documents, approves, and books individual transactions").
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facility and obligor grades, quantitative models, pricing models, and
industry and geographic analysis, which assist in the underwriting
process and provide data that is critical to the ongoing management of
the portfolio.1 61 It identities areas that are vital to the bank's survival,
allowing bank staff to drat credit terms with this in mind. 161 The more
detailed analysis, the better information it provides upon which banks
can base their decisions.162  The portfolio acquisition stage, with its
attention to detailed analysis, allows bankers and examiners to see the
first hint of storm clouds indicating that a portfolio plan is being
undermined. This occurs when exceptions to policy and credit term
standards stop becoming the exception and start becoming the norm.
In a time of economic health, the number and nature of exceptions
may be a banker's only way to detect portfolio deterioration.
The final phase of portfolio management is monitoring and
review, where a bank compares its existing portfolio with the portfolio
it intends to acquire. When the actual portfolio differs from the
planned portfolio, a bank should investigate the cause(s) of the
variance. "' Any variances from the bank's established policy,
whether in the actual lending or just the credit terms of a loan
agreement, that could have a material impact on the bank should be
brought to the attention of the bank's senior management and board. 164
Further, the OCC advises that banks should have systems in
place to analyze and control exceptions to their lending policies. 165
These systems should be implemented in this final stage of the loan
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. See id.
For example, a bank that uses a 10-point grading system and the analysis that can be
derived from it is far more informative than a grading system that uses more vague
categories of pass, special mention, substandard, doubtful, and loss. And, industry
analysis that attempts to correlate the performance of different industry segments is much
more useful than a standard industrial classification (SIC) listing.
Id.
163. See id. This analysis requires segmenting the portfolio in many ways (loan type,
borrower, collateral, geography, risk grade, rate, currency, and responsible
office/officer). See id.
164. See id. If the second phase of the active loan portfolio management is not done
well (and not enough data is gathered), then the third phase will not be as accurate. See
id. If it is done well, however, trends and patterns that, taken alone would indicate
nothing, could evidence a troubling variance in phase three. See id.
165. See Loan Portfolio Management, supra note 150.
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portfolio analysis. The OCC advises banks to track the aggregate
level of exceptions in order to detect shifts in the risk characteristics of
the loan portfolios. 166  Further, the OCC recommends that bank
management should "consider developing 'what if scenarios 67 for key
portfolio segments. " 161 These scenarios would identify "possible
credit risk triggers or event that could increase risk for a portfolio
segment or for the portfolio as a whole." 169 Such scenarios would
help syndicate members avoid the unseen detriments of changed
circumstances.
Thus, a what-if scenario that focused on the interest rate
segment would necessarily include a plan for what would happen if the
interest rates that the syndicated credit is based on become inadequate
to fully compensate the syndicates. 170 Since each bank's cost of funds
is different,17 ' each syndicate must independently establish its own
tolerance thresholds. This forward-looking recommendation
stimulates the agent to put in the credit agreement (before any sign of
risk) a credit term which would suspend the obligation of the banks to
make the type of loan affected until conditions change if interest rates
become inadequate.' 72 Further, if an agent determines that it is not
possible to continue to maintain the existing loans at the changed rate,
then it could also include a credit term that allows the repayment of
these loans or their conversion into a loan based upon another interest
rate.' 73 This federal recommendation helps agents and syndicates
avoid the grave financial consequence of having to maintain a
syndicated loan that costs the bank to maintain.
Careful drafting of credit terms also help guard against more
subtle risks.' 74 This is because the risks involved in syndicated loans,
while not new to banking, "may be less obvious and more complex
166. See id.
167. See OCC Advisory Letter 97-3, supra note 94, at 73,273. These scenarios "may
include interest rate changes, commodity or other price shocks, economic cycles, or
technological, political, or sociological changes." Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See Palmer, supra note 42, at 887.
171. See id. This cost depends on factors such as: regional location, business climate,
and credit status. See id. at 888.
172. See id.
173. See id.
174. See FRB Supervision and Regulation Letter 97-21, supra note 138, at 37,707.
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than the risks of traditional lending activities." '75 Bank managers
were warned by the Federal Reserve Board that this syndicated credit
activity could "involve credit, liquidity, operational, legal, and
reputational risks in concentrations and forms that may not be fully
recognized by bank management or adequately incorporated in an
institution's risk management systems." 176 It further noted that
"certain credit and liquidity enhancements177  that banking
organizations provide to facilitate various secondary market credit
activities may make the evaluation of the risks of these activities less
straightforward than the risks involved in traditional banking activities
in which assets are held in their entirety on the balance sheet of the
originating institution." 178
Thus, if the inclusion a credit term moves the credit risk
"associated with traditional on-balance-sheet assets into off-balance-
sheet contingent liabilities," 79 the actual credit risk can be difficult for
inexperienced lenders to assess."' 0 As borrowers shift credit risk off
the balance sheet, the risk implications of such a credit term need to be
thoroughly understood before an unsuspecting lender makes any
commitments. ' For example, a risk that is not represented on a
balance sheet occurs when there is an unexpected change in
circumstances that the syndicated credit agreement did not address,
such as when the "basis for determining interest rates becomes
175. Id. Former Comptroller Ludwig has stated that risks are particularly great "'for
downstream participants-banks that buy up pieces of large loans from other, typically
bigger, lenders.'" Domis, supra note 1, at 1.
176. FRB Supervision and Regulation Letter 97-21, supra note 138, at 37,707.
177. See id. "These enhancements... usually manifest themselves as recourse
provisions, securitization structures that entail credit-linked early amortization, and
collateral replacement events, and direct credit substitutes such as letters of credit. .. ."
Id. See also FRB Supervision and Regulation Letter 96-30, Risk Based Capital Treatment
for Spread Accounts that Provide Credit Enhancements for Securitized Receivables, [Vol.
4 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 51,906, at 51,908 (Nov. 7, 1996)
[hereinafter FRB Supervision and Regulation Letter 96-30].
178. FRB Supervision and Regulation Letter 97-21, supra note 138, at 37,707-11.
179. Id. at 37,707-11. The Federal Reserve highlights several transactions that may
potentially expose a bank to risk even if they are removed from the balance sheet: "loan
sales with recourse, credit derivatives, direct credit substitutes, such as letters of credit,
and liquidity facilities extended to securitization programs. . . ." Id.
180. Id. This is particularly true as the complexity and indirect nature of these
transactions increase. See id.
181. See OCC Advisory Letter 97-3, supra note 94, at 73,272-73.
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unavailable or provides inadequate compensation to the banks." 82
Even if there are credit terms within the loan agreement that provide
for the method of obtaining an applicable interest rate, a situation may
arise where no market in dollar deposits for the interest period desired
by the borrower is available. 83  Another example of a changed
circumstance is when new regulatory requirements are subsequently
adopted by banking regulators that apply to the agreement and that
increase the cost to the banks of maintaining a particular loan.
184
These risks, if not properly addressed by carefully drafted credit
terms, are effectively shifted from borrowers to banks because banks
must ultimately absorb the cost. Thus, without careful consideration of
credit terms, syndicate banks unknowingly may be exposing
themselves to hidden obligations that may not become evident unless
and until the transactions deteriorate.
C. Internal Controls
A third risk presented by syndicated credits is that a bank does
not have the infrastructure necessary to compete successfully in the
syndicated loan market. 8 ' New entrants are rapidly entering the
syndicated loan market. 8 6  Those that wish to be successful cannot
underestimate the necessity of having adequate internal mechanisms to
thrive in the syndicated market. 187 Clearly, as competition increases,
industry recognition and reputation will be vital for an agent's
continued survival in the syndicated loan market. 88 Adequate internal
182. Palmer, supra note 42, at 887.
183. See id.
184. See FRB Supervision and Regulation Letter 97-21, supra note 138, at 37,707-10
(stating that banks "should remain alert to the possibility that loan performance could
deteriorate if certain sectors of the economy experience problems").
185. See Mahua Dutta, Syndicated Loan Boom May Hurt Due Diligence, AM. BANKER,
July 24, 1997, at 8.
186. See Omri Ben-Amos, Credit Risk Management Trend: Policing Whole Loan
Portfolios, AM. BANKER, Sept. 19, 1997, at 7. Preliminary findings of a new risk
management survey among 64 banks with assets of more than $5 billion showed that while
only 24% of banks now use syndications to manage their corporate loan portfolios, 57%
of those surveyed expect to use them often by 1999. See id. Robert Morris Associates
conducted the survey, while a consultant at First Manhattan Consulting Group analyzed it.
See id.
187. See OCC Advisory Letter 97-3, supra note 94, at 73,271.
188. See Loan Portfolio Management, supra note 150.
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infrastructure can help banks gain that recognition and reputation. 189
Typically, weak internal controls are marked by two deficiencies:
inadequate staffing and inadequate management information systems.
1. Inadequate Staffing
Despite the syndicated loan market's rapid increase,1 90 bank
loan staffs have not been expanding at the same level.' 9' Bank loan
departments have not regained the manpower they had in the early
1990s, before they fell victim to the vigorous cost-cutting programs.' 92
In this increasingly competitive marketplace, the main question
syndicate members ask is, "How on top of the credit is the agent?"193
This question marks a valid concern of the sufficiency of a bank's due
diligence about borrowers.194 The objective of due diligence is
typically to "ascertain and corroborate all material facts concerning a
specific transaction." 195 Thus, an agent should gather and corroborate
all material facts about a borrower. 196 Regulators have also noted that
due diligence is suffering as banks compete for deals based on
speed. 197 Given these circumstances, syndicate members are taking on
the discipline themselves while dealing with what they view as a slide
in the discipline of the agent banks. 9 Due diligence cannot be done
quickly (to keep up with demand of market) without adequate staffing
levels. 9 9 However, there is a recognizable reward for national banks
that make this investment in staff: increased reputation, the ability to
189. See id.
190. See Dutta, Syndicated Loan Boom May Hurt Due Diligence, supra note 185, at 8.
191. See OCC Advisory Letter 97-3, supra note 94, at 73,271.
192. Dutta, Syndicated Loan Boom May Hurt Due Diligence, supra note 185, at 8.
193. Id.
194. See id.
195. See Scott M. Zimmerman & Daniel I. Goldberg, Due Diligence and Its Impact on
the Transaction, in ADVANCED DOING DEALS: A STRATEGIC APPROACH TO COMPLETING
TRANSACTIONS 245 (1998) (emphasis added).
196. See id.
197. See Dutta, Syndicated Loan Boom May Hurt Due Diligence, supra note 185, at 8
(noting that regulators noticed banks' willingness to compromise due diligence).
198. See id. Some syndicate members have reported that they "have received from
agent-banks incomplete information on deals." Id. Some said they even have been asked
"to commit to loans without being shown any documentation." Id.
199. Id. (observing that lenders at one particular bank are given only two weeks to
complete due diligence on some borrowers, with those lenders "juggling and hoping that
everything turns out all right").
1999]
NORTH CAR OLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
get and process financial information quickly, and the possible gain of
market share in ever-crowded marketplace. 20 0  Thus, without an
adequate staff to complete due diligence thoroughly and quickly, an
agent bank may not succeed in the crowding syndicate loan
marketplace.
There is much to gain when a bank performs due diligence
well, thereby improving its reputation among investors. 20, Banks that
wish to become agents in syndicated transactions must maintain the
ability to attract a cadre of other lenders. 202 Further, every client
relationship that a bank can cultivate increases its chances for being
chosen as agent and entitled to earn lucrative fee income. 203  An
adequately sized staff that allows due diligence done quickly and
accurately can help banks do this.
Adequate staff levels can also help banks avoid risks . 2' Loan
syndication underwriting may present significant risk exposure to lead
underwriters because "syndicate participants may seek to hold the lead
underwriter responsible for actual or perceived inadequacies in the
loan's underwriting even though the participants are responsible for
conducting an independent due diligence of the credit." 205 There may
be pressure on the agent-bank to "repurchase portions of the
syndication if the credit deteriorates in order to protect its reputation in
the market even though the syndication was sold without recourse." 206
A staffs timely performance of adequate due diligence would greatly
reduce this possibility.
The need for due diligence increases greatly when an agent is
200. See Loan Portfolio Management, supra note 150. See also OCC Advisory Letter
97-3, supra note 94, at 73,271
201. See Ben-Amos, Honeywell Demands that its Banks Understand It, supra note 139,
at 6. Chase Manhattan Bank was chosen to lead a $1.325 billion five-year syndicated
credit agreement for Honeywell, Inc. See id. The Chief Executive Officer of Honeywell
remarked that Chase "has earned this business, based upon their relationship, their
service, and their leadership in the syndicated credit market." Id.
202. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. Agent banks are chosen to lead the
syndicate based on, among other things, their ability to attract lenders. See supra note 35
and accompanying text.
203. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
204. See Loan Portfolio Management, supra note 150. Damage to a bank's reputation
can cause the value of a bank's stock to fail, a loss of customer and community support,
and a loss of new business opportunities. See id.
205. FRB Supervision and Regulation Letter 97-21, supra note 138, at 37,707-13.
206. Id.
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entering a credit agreement with a borrower that is part of an industry
that the agent is unfamiliar with. 207 For example, normal practice in
the jewelry industry is that when a sale occurs between jewelers,
payment is not required until there is a sale to an ultimate customer.0 8
This is not a written industry standard, but rather an accepted
custom. 0 9 One bank, which did not investigate the jewelry industry,
extended two lines of credit totaling over $1 million to a jewelry
wholesaler.2 10  Because the repayment by the wholesaler was
contingent on the resale of the underlying goods by the retailer, the
bank was exposed to risk from an aging of the trade note should the
loan not pay at maturity. 21' Further, the bank was exposed to any
intervening deterioration in the borrower's financial condition or the
possibility of loss or diversion of the underlying goods.212 The bank
ultimately sustained significant losses because it did not perform due
diligence about the company's practices, thus, not properly structuring
the loan. Therefore, due diligence can insulate banks from taking
risks that can be avoided prior to the issuance of the loan.
One of the world's five largest biotech firms secured a $225
million syndicated loan in December 1996.213 The experience of its
chief financial officer in that deal is illustrative of how the inadequate
nature of an agent's due diligence can affect an agent-bank's
reputation. 2"4 His complaint was that "by the time they found more
about us through their due diligence, they decided we were riskier
than they wanted a client to be." 21s This just an example of the larger
trend: that the quality and thoroughness of due diligence conducted by
agents of borrowers is slipping, causing potential problems for the
banks and other institutions that buy pieces of syndicated loans.216 The
207. ROBERT MORRIS ASSOCIATES, SPILLED MILK: A SPECIAL COLLECTION FROM THE
JOURNAL OF COMMERCIAL BANK LENDING ON LOANS THAT WENT SOUR 13 (1985).
208. See id. at 14.
209. See id.
210. See id. at 13.
211. See id. at 14.
212. See id.
213. See Ben-Amos, Wanted: A Relationship Beyond the Deal, supra note 130, at 24.
214. See id. David J. McLachlan, chief financial officer, stated that "[w]e went almost
to the altar with another bank, and at the last minute ... they backed out and left us high
and dry." 1d. (emphasis added).
215. Id. (emphasis added)
216. See Dutta, Syndicated Loan Boom May Hurt Due Diligence, supra note 185, at 8.
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due diligence problem is attributed to the agents "who increasingly are
promising to get money to their clients fast." 217
The OCC deemed due diligence important enough to proscribe
specific aspects of it to reduce credit risk.21 s It advises that a bank
"should segment its portfolio in a number of different ways." ' 219
Banks should identify risks to identify possible covariances,
similarities, or interrelationships among portfolio segments . 2 20 Thus,
only after risk diversification objectives have been established by the
staff, via due diligence analysis, is a bank is able to ascertain what
terms should effect their lending decisions.22' This type of
thoroughness that will insure a bank's continued survival in the
syndicated loan marketplace.
2. Inadequate Management Information Systems
The OCC has observed that the syndicated credit management
information systems (MIS) has not kept pace with loan portfolio
growth.222 Today's loan portfolio managers must base their decisions
on "moving pictures across a broad spectrum of market, operational,
and credit risks." 22 3 Banks with inadequate MIS are making decisions
without the detailed information that is essential to this analysis. 224
217. Id. (resulting in banks trying to make more deals in less time).
218. See OCC Advisory Letter 97-3, supra note 94, at 73,271.
219. See id. Examples include loan type, industry, geography, structure, collateral,
tenor, and risk of default or loss. See id. at 73,272. "The same loan may be included in
several portfolio segments based on different risk elements." See id.
220. Id. For further reasons why banks should segment its portfolio, see James H.
Gilkeson & Gary E. Porter, Large Retail Time Deposits and U.S. Treasury Securities
(1986-95): Evidence of a Segmenting Market, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,
E&PA Working Paper 97-12, July 1997, <www.occ.treas.gov/wp97-12.htm>. "Flight
from insured balances into money market funds and other uninsured investments has left
banks with a group of investors who are uncommonly insensitive to interest rates, or
equivalently, have the highest switching costs." Id. A bank that has not segmented its
portfolio would not be able to take advantage of the OCC paper's ultimate conclusion that
banks "are able to extract available surplus from the depositor segment of the risk-free
debt investors." Id. This surplus "helps to make up for the loss of the banks' more rate-
sensitive investors." Id.
221. See OCC Advisory Letter 97-3, supra note 94, at 73,271.
222. Id.
223. See Patricia A Murphy, Enterprisewide Risk Targeted by Managers, AM.
BANKER, Aug. 5, 1996, at 12A.
224. See id. The OCC recommends that the senior management and board members
assess periodically the adequacy of their bank's credit MIS "in light of recent loan growth,
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Due to the size of a loan portfolio, effective management of it requires
good information on aspects of a bank's lending unit. 225 An adequate
MIS provides this good information by giving "banks the ability to
segment their loan portfolios and to assess more accurately key risk
characteristics." 226  Thus, one way for banks to reduce the risk of
syndicated lending is to invest in an adequate MIS.
Ways that an adequate MIS can provide effective management
for banks is illustrated by examining its application to liquidity risk, a
common risk associated with lending about a bank's ability of convert
obligations into money if necessary.227 With the right information,
banks can use their loan portfolio as a source of liquidity by "reducing
the total dollar volume of loans through sales, securitization, and
portfolio ran-off., 228  An adequate MIS can provide information that
will help a bank decide which of its existing loans it should liquidate.
It can do this by identifying those loans or loan portfolio segments that
are easily convertible into money. 229 A MIS can keep track of a loan's
"quality, pricing, scheduled maturities, and conformity to market
standards for underwriting," all of which will help a bank determine a
loan's liquidity. 230  A loan's marketability depends on the type and
quality of the loan. 23' A MIS can provide this information on each
individual loan for an entire loan unit. Thus, a MIS can provide banks
acquisitions, and changes in the bank's appetite for risk." OCC Advisory Letter 97-3,
supra note 94, at 73,271 (emphasis added).
225. See Loan Portfolio Management, supra note 150. Traditionally, the loan portfolio
has not been viewed as a significant source of funds for liquidity management. See id.
But, with the advent of a secondary market for loans, this may change. See supra notes
60-65 and accompanying text.
226. See OCC Advisory Letter 97-3 supra note 94, at 73,271. Also, the OCC has
made clear that it will evaluate "whether senior management has sufficient knowledge and
skills to manage the bank's use of technology." Id. To that effect, former Comptroller
Ludwig stated that "it is vital that the bank's senior management- right up to the chief
executive officer- understand the risks and opportunities presented by technology." Id.
227. A liquidity risk is one of nine categories that the OCC has identified as a risk
incident to lending. See Loan Portfolio Management, supra note 150.
228. See id. Loans are also a source of liquidity when used as collateral for
borrowings. See id. However, a bank that decides to reduce or sell existing commitments
must consider reputation risk and the potential for lender-liability actions. See id. A
bank's ability to maintain a customer base will be reduced if it is viewed as an unreliable
lender. See id. Further, its reputation may suffer if the community perceives it as
unwilling to support community credit needs. See id.
229. See id.
230. Id.
231. See id.
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with valuable information which help them make lucrative decisions.
Liquidity is also influenced by the amount of a bank's
commitment to lend and the actual amount that a borrower has drawn
against that commitment.232 A MIS could provide a system to track
such commitments and borrower usage.233 It could also provide up-to-
date information on the types of commitments, prospective deals, and
average usage levels to help banks predict how much liquidity will be
needed in the future.234  Further, it could distinguish between
commitments that a bank is legally obligated to fund and those that it
is not helping banks determine which commitments are discretionary
and can be legally liquidated from a bank's books.235 Therefore, a
MIS can help banks predict their future liquidity requirements and
fully comply with their legal obligations.
Lastly, besides being an aide to making salient business
decisions, a MIS can be used for product development.236 The latest
computer systems can be used to make money, not just as a defensive
mechanism or an analysis tool. 237 While normally a bank's balance
sheet may create risks connected to a sudden downturn in interest
rates, it's possible to use an MIS to create financial products that have
the opposite effect.238 Thus, modern MIS can solve both existing and
future problems.
IV. CONCLUSION
Banks need to address the risks associated with syndicated
credits. Investment in solutions to these risks will not only reduce a
bank's risk level, but also increase a bank's ability to attract and retain
customers. Further, such voluntary action will likely reduce the
attention paid to syndicated loans by federal regulators.239 If banks
232. See id.
233. See id.
234. See id. High usage levels would help determine if the available liquidity will be
adequate. See id.
235. See id.
236. See Murphy, supra note 223, at 12A.
237. See id.
238. See id.
239. The OCC's regulations are "risk-focused and results-oriented." OCC Bulletin
97-8, OCC Standards for Developing Regulations Description, [Vol. 4 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH), 35,103 (Jan. 21, 1997). By reducing the risks
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want to avoid regulation and its accompanying costs, 240 they should
take steps to deal with the risks identified in Part II. Nineteen-ninety-
eight proved that economic conditions affect the volume of syndicated
loans. While most banks successfully weathered the slight economic
downturn, national banks would be wise to begin examining the risk of
syndicated credits now instead of waiting for one celebrated disaster
that reins everyone in.
MEGAN ELIZABETH JONES
voluntarily, banks can avoid the necessity of federal intervention or regulation. See id.
Thus, if banks do not plan for the unexpected "rainy day," they can expect regulators to
step in. See id.
240. See id. The OCC recognizes the potential impact of its regulation and notes in
one of its organizing principles that "[r]egulations can also affect national banks' ability to
compete by contributing significantly to their costs." Id. See also John P. Danforth, Who
Pays for the High Cost of Excessive Regulation?, BANKING POL'Y REP., May 3-17, 1993,
at 24, available in LEXIS, Bankng Library, Bnkpol File.
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